UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

7-8-2013

Rowley v. Ada County Highway Dist. Respondent's
Brief Dckt. 40672

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"Rowley v. Ada County Highway Dist. Respondent's Brief Dckt. 40672" (2013). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 4260.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/4260

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

ADA COUNTY HIGHWAY DISTRICT
Appellant,

Supreme Court Docket No. 40672-2013
Ada County Case no. CV-OC-1208384

vs.
TERRIE H. ROWLEY, a married person
dealing with her sole and separate property,
Respondent.

RESPONSE BRIEF OF RESPONDENT TERRIE H. ROWLEY

Appeal from the Fourth Judicial District, Ada County, Idaho
Honorable Mike Wetherell, Presiding

Thomas E. Dvorak
Emily L. McClure
Preston N. Carter
Givens Pursley LLP
Post Office Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720
Attorneys for Respondent

Scott D. Hess
A. Dean Bennett
Holland & Hart LLP
Post Office Box 2527
Boise, Idaho 83701-2527
Attorneys for Appellant

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
ADA COUNTY HIGHWAY DISTRlCT
Appellant,

Supreme Court Docket No. 40672-2013
Ada County Case no. CV-OC-1208384

vs.
TERRIE H. ROWLEY, a married person
dealing with her sole and separate property,
Respondent.

RESPONSE BRIEF OF RESPONDENT TERRIE H. ROWLEY

Appeal from the Fourth Judicial District, Ada County, Idaho
Honorable Mike Wetherell, Presiding

Thomas E. Dvorak
Emily L. McClure
Preston N. Carter
Givens Pursley LLP
Post Office Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720
Attorneys for Respondent

Scott D. Hess
A. Dean Bennett
Holland & Hart LLP
Post Office Box 2527
Boise, Idaho 83701-2527
Attorneys for Appellant

T ABLE OF CONTENTS
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................................................................................................. 1
I.

Nature of the Case ................................................................................................... 1

II.

Course of Proceedings ............................................................................................. 3

III.

Statement of Facts ................................................................................................... 4
A.

The 1950 Plat ............................................................................................... 4

B.

The 1954 Plat. .............................................................................................. 5

C.

Other undisputed material facts ................................................................... 6

ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON ApPEAL ................................................................................... 7
ATTORNEY FEES ON ApPEAL ........................................................"................................................... 7
ARGUMENT ....................................................................................................................................... 7
I.

Standard of review ................................................................................................... 7

II.

The 1954 Plat clearly and unequivocally dedicates the Walk Way to the
public ....................................................................................................................... 9

III.

The Walk Way is a "highway" and a "public right-of-way" owned by
ACHD .................................................................................................................... 20
A.

The power of the ACHD to administer the Walk Way was not
raised below ............................................................................................... 20

B.

The Walk Way is a "highway." ................................................................. 21

C.

(1)
The Walk Way is an "adjacent land." ............................................ 22
(2)
The Walk Way is a "pedestrian facility." ...................................... 23
The Walk Way is a "public right-of-way." ................................................ 26

D.

ACHD owns the Walk Way ...................................................................... 28

IV.

ACHD's remaining arguments are not persuasive ................................................ 29

V.

Ms. Rowley is entitled to attorney fees on appeal. ................................................ 30

CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................................. 31
ATTACHMENT 1 .............................................................................................................................. 33
ATTACHMENT 2 .............................................................................................................................. 36

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases
Anderson & Naftiger v. Newcomb, Inc.,
100 Idaho 175,595 P.2d 709 (1979) ........................................................................................ 7
Asbury Park, LLC v. Greenbriar Estate Homeowners' Ass 'n, Inc.,
138 Idaho 378, 271 P.3d 1194 (2012) .................................................................................... 18
Davis v. Fendell,
158 Wash. App. 1043, *4 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011) ............................................................ 13, 14
Farrell v. Board of Comm 'rs of Lemhi County,
138 Idaho 378, 64 P.3d 304 (2002) ........................................................................................ 18
Freeman v. Juker,
119 Idaho 555, 808 P.2d 1300 (1991) .............................................................................. 20, 21
Harshbarger v. Jerome County,
107 Idaho 805, 693 P.2d 451 (1984) ........................................................................................ 9
Homestead Farms, Inc. v. Board of Com 'rs of Teton County,
141 Idaho 855, 119 P.3d 630 (2005) ...................................................................................... 25
Kepler-Fleenor v. Freemont County,
152 Idaho 207, 268 P.3d 1159 (2012) .................................................................................... 14
Kepler-Fleenor v. Fremont Cnty.,
152 Idaho 207, 268 P.3d 1159 (2012) .................................................................................. 8, 9
Lattin v. Adams County, 149 Idaho 147,236 P.3d 1257 (2010) ............................................... 9, 15
Mickelsen v. Broadway Ford, Inc.,
153 Idaho 149,280 P.3d 176 (2012) ........................................................................................ 7
Myers v. Workmen's Auto Ins. Co.,
140 Idaho 495, 95 P.3d 977 (2004) .............................................................................. 8, 23, 26
Ochoa v. State, Ins. Special Indem. Fund,
118 Idaho 71, 794P.2d 1127(1990) ...................................................................................... 19
Paddison Scenic Props., Family Trust, L.C v. Idaho Cnty.,
153 Idaho 1,278 P.3d 403 (2012) ............................................................................................ 8
Ponderosa Homesite Lot Owners v. Garfield Bay Resort, Inc.,
143 Idaho 407, 146 P.3d 673 (2006) ...................................................................................... 18

11

Ross v. Dorsey,
Idaho - -, - - P.3d - - ,2013 WL 3064793 (June 20, 2013) ............................ 16
Shaw v. Johnston,
17 Idaho 676,107 P. 399 (1910) ............................................................................................ 18
Smylie v. Pearsall,
93 Idaho 188,457 P.2d 427 (1969) ........................................................................................ 11
State v. Fox,
100 Idaho 140,594 P.2d 1093 (1979) ...................................................................................... 9
Stone brook Const., LLC v. Chase Home Finance, LLC,
152 Idaho 927, 277 P.3d 374 (2012) ........................................................................................ 7
Thomas v. Thomas,
150 Idaho 636, 249 P .3d 829 (2011) ........................................................................................ 7
Volco, Inc. v. Lickley,
126 Idaho 709, 889 P.2d 1099 (1995) ....... :...................................................................... 10, 14
Worley Highway Dist. v. Yacht Club of Coeur D'Alene, Ltd.,
116 Idaho 219, 775 P.2d 111 (1989) .................................................................................. 9, 27
Statutes
Idaho Code § 12-117 ....................................................................................................................... 7
Idaho Code § 12-117(1) ................................................................................................................. 29
Idaho Code § 40-109(5) .......................................................................................................... passim
Idaho Code § 40-117(9) ........................................................................................................... 24, 25
Idaho Code § 40-1310 ......................................................................................................... 6, 24, 28
Idaho Code § 40-1409(2) ............................................................................................................... 26
Idaho Code § 40-202(3) ................................................................................................................. 25
Idaho Code § 49-117(5) ................................................................................................................. 23
Idaho Code § 49-117(6) ................................................................................................................. 23
Idaho Code § 49-117(9) ................................................................................................................. 26
Idaho Code § 50-1309 ..................................................................................................................... 9

1ll

Idaho Code § 67-6518 ................................................................................................................... 27
Idaho Code §§ 50-1309, 50-1313 (1982) ........................................................................................ 9
Other Authorities

Act of Mar. 26,1988, ch. 175, sec. 2,1988 Idaho Sess. Laws 306,307 ......................................... 9
Webster's Unabridged Dictionary (2d ed. 1998) .................................................................... 21, 22
Rules

Idaho Appellate Rules 4 11 .............................................................................................................8
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(a) ................................................................................................ 8

IV

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is Plaintiff/Appellee Terrie H. Rowley's response brief. It responds to Appel/ant's

Opening Brief("Opening Brief') filed by Defendant/Appellant Ada County Highway District
("ACHD") on May 16,2013.

I.

NATURE OF THE CASE

This is an appeal from the District Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Ms.
Rowley. The District Court decided two issues. First, the plat for Ms. Rowley's subdivision
clearly and unequivocally dedicated to the public a corridor, labeled "Walk Way," that allows
pedestrians travelling along Taggert Street to pass through an otherwise-obstructive block of
subdivision property.l Second, ACHD owns the Walk Way because it is a "pedestrian facility"
and thus a highway. See Idaho Code § 40-109(5) ("Highways shall include ... pedestrian
facilities .... "). Ms. Rowley takes the position that the plat itself unequivocally demonstrates
the original grantor's intent to dedicate this Walk Way to the public. But even if there is any
ambiguity in any portion ofthe Plat2, it is not ambiguity that rises to the level of an
"irreconcilable conflict" (R. 164) that precludes the finder of fact from finding that the grantor
unequivocally expressed an intent to make a public dedication of this Walk Way. The main
position advocated by ACHD is a semantic one that rotely equates the word "equivocal" with

contends the Walk Way "runs perpendicular to two public streets." Opening
Brief at 1. That is true but misleading. All north-south corridors are perpendicular to east-west
streets. The Walk Way is more accurately described as continuing Taggert Street's north-south
corridor for pedestrian traffic.
1 ACHD

2

And Ms. Rowley takes the position that there is no such ambiguity.
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"ambiguous" and derives therefrom, ipso jacto, that any ambiguity whatsoever in any of the
evidence of a grantor's intent automatically dooms any argued public dedication. Appellants
Brief at p. 21 In other words, that any sort of ambiguity whatsoever prevents a determination of
the requisite clear and unequivocal grantor's intent to make a public dedication. This position, if
adopted, would result in a situation where unless a plat spells out in painful and exquisite words
with no ambiguity whatsoever that specific items on the plat are indeed dedicated, no dedication
occurs. This is not and should not be the law for policy reasons, as was argued by Ms. Rowley's
counsel to the District Court below:
ACHD has the simple means to abandon this public right-of-way if they
don't need it. They just go through and notice up a proceeding and then they
abandon it. It's-it's not a problem. In fact, they should be concerned because
ACHD may essentially be cutting of its own nose to spite its face by arguing for
such a high, limited standard. Any ambiguity at all prevents a public dedication
from having occurred. Careful what you wish for. In the future that may come
back to bite you. They may want a lower standard in the future for sidewalks,
ancillary facilities or roadways in the future and so forth to ensure those things are
dedicated and [to] not have an issue [requiring condemnation].
Transcript of September 7, 2012 Summary Judgment Argument (hereinafter "Tr.") at p. 43. 3
ACHD also improperly raises new arguments regarding its authority for the first time on
appeal; arguments, which even if this Court sees fit to address on the merits, it should find these
arguments have none. ACHD's other arguments are merely technical criticisms of aspects of
the District Court's analysis, and do not not establish that summary judgment was erroneously

3 Notably, ACHD's counsel responded to this policy argument by making pointed
comments that seemed to be aimed directly at Ms. Rowley, saying "[Y]eah, be careful what you
wish for. If this is a public roadway, everything that they have in it will be removed. We can't
be compelled to abandon anything. So be careful what you ask for." Tr. at p. 44.
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granted. Therefore this Court should affinn.

II.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

On May 9,2002, Ms. Rowley filed a Complaint against ACHD, the City of Boise, and
Canuta D. Boerem. Record on Appeal ("R") at 6-7. The Complaint asserted two counts relevant
to this appeal: (1) declaratory judgment that the Walk Way is a public right-of-way, id. at 9; and
(2) declaratory judgment that ACHD owns the Walk Way, id. at 10. 4
In lieu of answering, ACHD filed a Motionfor Summary Judgment ("Motion"). Id. at 2829. The Motion contended Ms. Rowley's lawsuit was "absurd" because the final plat for Ms.
Rowley's subdivision (" 1954 Plat") did not clearly and unequivocally dedicate the Walk Way to
the public. Rat 38 & n.l (Motion at 2 & n.l). Both parties filed memoranda, affidavits, and
other materials to support their respective positions. Id. at 30-36 (ACHD's affidavits supporting
and materials); id. at 90-109 (Ms. Rowley's supporting affidavit and materials).
After considering the parties' evidence and the relevant Covenants, Conditions, and
Restrictions ("CC&Rs"), the District Court concluded (1) "[t]he grantors' intent to dedicate the
walkway to the public is clear," R at 168 (Memorandum Decision and Order re: Motionfor

Summary Judgment ("Decision") at 12); and (2) "ACHD holds title to the walkway," id. at 169
(Decision at 13). Based on these conclusions the District Court denied ACHD's motion for
4 The Complaint asserted three other counts: (3) in the alternative, declaratory judgment
that the City of Boise owns the Walk Way, id. at 10; (4) declaratory judgment that, in the event
ACHD or the City abandoned the Walk Way, Ms. Rowley is entitled to half of the abandoned
property under the common-law doctrine of abutter, Rat 11; and (5) an order requiring Ms.
Boerem to remove the shed she had built on the Walk Way, id. at 12. Count 3 is moot because
Ms. Rowley stipulated to dismiss the City of Boise without prejudice. See R at 259 (granting
stipulated dismissal. Counts 4 and 5 are not relevant to this appeal.
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summary judgment and granted summary judgment to Ms. Rowley. Id. at 178 (Decision at 22).
ACHD moved for certification under Rule 54(b). Id. at 182,264. The District Court
entered judgment on counts 1 and 2 of the Complaint. Id. at 264-65. ACHD appealed. Id.
at 289.

III.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

This dispute centers on the plats for Cherry Lane Subdivision (the "Subdivision"). The
Subdivision was platted in two steps: the first in 1950 ("1950 Plat") and the second in 1954. The
1950 Plat is in the record as Exhibit B to the Affidavit ofScott D. Hess in Support of Defendant
ACHD's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Hess Affidavit"). Rat 34 (Hess Affidavit Exh. B). It is
attached to this Response Brief as Attachment 1. The 1954 Plat is in the record as Exhibit 1 to
the Affidavit of Emily L. McClure ("McClure Affidavit"). R at 94 (McClure Affidavit Exh. 1). It
is attached to this Response Brief as Attachment 2.
A. The 1950 Plat
The 1950 Plat identifies the lots, streets, and utility easements on the north half of the
Subdivision. Rat 34 (Hess Affidavit Exh. B). It delineates (but does not label as a "Walk Way")
the Walk Way as a strip of property forming a north-south corridor through Block 3 of the
Subdivision. Id. The north side of Taggert Street extends northward from the Walk Way's
endpoint in Block 3. !d. The Walk Way thus continues Taggert Street's north-south corridor for
pedestrian traffic through Block 3, which would otherwise obstruct pedestrian traffic. Id. The
1950 Plat provides, "[t]he owners hereby dedicate to the use of the public forever all streets, not
heretofore dedicated, as shown on this plat." Id. (emphasis added). It does not mention public
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easements or public rights-of-way other than streets. It does mention and delineate an
"Easement for Public Utilities," but does not indicate this as part of any legend.
B. The 1954 Plat

The 1954 Plat covers the south half of the Subdivision. Id. at 94 (McClure Affidavit
Exh. 1). Consistent with the 1950 Plat, it demarcates the Walk Way as a strip of property
forming a north-south corridor through Block 3. Id. The Walk Way is labeled "Walk Way." Id.
The south side of Taggert Street is also labeled. Id. The word "Taggert" is located on the south
side of the Walk Way, while the word "Street" is located on the north side, indicating that
Taggert Street's corridor continues through the Walk Way. Id. The Walk Way abuts the north
side of the Taggert Street/Kathryn Street intersection and the south side of the Taggert StreetlDill
Drive intersection. Id. A pedestrian traveling north along Taggert Street would cross Kathryn
Street, pass through Block 3 on the Walk Way, cross Dill Drive, and continue north along
Taggert Street. Id. Without the Walk Way, the same pedestrian would have to tum east on
Kathryn Street, walk north on Broxon Street, walk west on Dill Drive, and then tum north on
Taggert Street. Id. The Walk Way thus extends the north-south corridor of Taggert Street
through Block 3 of the Subdivision for pedestrian traffic.
The 1954 Plat provides, "The owners do hereby dedicate to the use of the public, forever,
all streets and rights of way easements not heretofore dedicated as shown on the plat." Id.
(emphasis added). The Plat delineates street borders using a solid line. Id. Streets are labeled
by name using small-capital letters. Id. The Walk Way's borders are delineated with a solid
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line, just like the streets. Id It is labeled by name with small-capital letters, just like the streets.

Id
The legend for the 1954 Plat is located in the lower right-hand comer. Id The symbol
for Public Utilities Easements is a dotted line or cross-hatching. Id

This appears to identify the

same "Easement for Public Utilities" denoted on the earlier 1950 Plat. The legend does not
contain a symbol identifying streets. Id The borders of the streets-which are undisputedly
dedicated to the public-are delineated by a solid line and the streets are labeled with small
capital letters, just like the Walk Way. Id

C. Other undisputed material facts
Ms. Rowley purchased a lot adjacent to the Walk Way in 1992. Id at 96 (Ms. Rowley's
deed).
The 1954 Plat was accepted by the City of Boise. Id (indicating the "Approval of City
Council"). ACHD has jurisdiction over highways and public rights-of-way within the City of
Boise. See Idaho Code § 40-1310. "Highway" is defined to include "adjacent lands" and
"pedestrian facilities." Idaho Code § 40-109(5) ("Highways shall include necessary culverts,
sluices, ditches ... roadside improvements, adjacent lands or interests lawfully acquired,
pedestrian facilities, and any other structures, works or fixtures incidental to the preservation or
improvement of the highways." (emphasis added)). ACHD does not dispute that it has
jurisdiction over all "highways" and "public rights-of-way" within the City of Boise. See Idaho
Code § 40-1310 (highway districts have "exclusive general supervision authority of all public
highways, public streets, and public rights-of-way under their jurisdiction"). Thus ACHD owns
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the Walk Way if (1) the 1954 Plat dedicated the Walk Way to the public and (2) the Walk Way is
a "highway" or a "public right of way" within the meaning ofIdaho Code § 40-1310. The
undisputed facts establish both these points. Therefore the grant of summary judgment should be
affirmed.
ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON ApPEAL

In addition to the issues identified in the Opening Brief, Ms. Rowley identifies the
following:
1. Do alternate grounds support the conclusion the 1954 Plat clearly and unequivocally
dedicated the walkway to the public?
2. Do alternate grounds support the conclusion ACHD owns the Walk Way?
3. May ACHD raise a variety oflegal issues for the first time on Appeal?
4. Is Ms. Rowley entitled to attorney fees on appeal under Idaho Code § 12-117?
ATTORNEY FEES ON ApPEAL

ACHD does not request attorney fees on appeal. Ms. Rowley requests attorney fees on
appeal under Idaho Code § 12-117.
ARGUMENT

I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court "reviews appeals from an order of summary judgment de novo, and the
standard of review is the same as the standard used by the trial court." Stonebrook Const., LLC
v. Chase Home Finance, LLC, 152 Idaho 927, 929, 277 P.3d 374, 376 (2012) (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted). "Where the evidence reveals no disputed issues of material fact,
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then only a question of law remains, over which this Court exercises free review." Id. at 930,
277 P.3d at 377 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The Court is free to uphold a district court's judgment on any grounds supported by the
record. Grabicki v. City ofLewiston,

P.3d _,2013 WL 2249259, *6 n.2 (May 23,

2013) (the Court "may affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment on alternate
grounds"); Mickelsen v. Broadway Ford, Inc., 153 Idaho 149, 155,280 P.3d 176, 182 (2012)
("The decision ofthe district court is affirmed on alternate grounds."); Thomas v. Thomas, 150
Idaho 636, 644, 249 P.3d 829,837 (2011) ("[W]e affirm the decision of the district court
dismissing the unjust-enrichment claim on an alternative basis."); Anderson & Naftiger v.
Newcomb, Inc., 100 Idaho 175, 179,595 P.2d 709, 713 (1979) ("[W]here an order of a lower

court is correct but is based upon an erroneous theory, the order will be affirmed upon the correct
theory."). The Court reviews the judgment of the district court, not its reasoning. See, e.g.,
Idaho Appellate Rule 11 ("An appeal as a matter of right may be taken to the Supreme Court
from the following judgments and orders .... " (emphasis added)); Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 54(a) ("A judgment shall not contain ... the court's legal reasoning .... ").
Therefore, in this appeal the Court is not asked to determine whether the District Court selected
the most artful method of resolving the case. It is asked whether the District Court entered the
correct judgment, i. e., whether Mr. Rowley is entitled to summary judgment.
Similarly, this Court "will not reverse the trial court if an alleged error is harmless."
Myers v. Workmen's Auto Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 495,504,95 P.3d 977, 986 (2004).
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The District Court's judgment is correct. The 1954 Plat unequivocally dedicated the
Walk Way to the public. The Walk Way is a "highway" because it is land adjacent to a roadway
and because it is a pedestrian facility. The Walk Way is also a public right-of-way.

II.

THE

1954 PLAT CLEARLY AND UNEQUIVOCALLY DEDICATES THE WALK WAY TO THE

PUBLIC.

The first issue is whether the 1954 Plat clearly and unequivocally dedicates the Walk
Way to the public. It does.
"The essential elements of a common law dedication of land are (1) an offer by the
owner, clearly and unequivocally indicated by his words or act evidencing his intention to
dedicate the land to a public use, and (2) an acceptance of the offer by the public." Paddison

Scenic Props., Family Trust,

I.e. v. Idaho Cnty., 153 Idaho 1,4,278 P.3d 403, 405 (2012)

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). "[W]hen deciding whether a dedication
occurred, plats are to be interpreted like deeds." Kepler-Fleenor v. Fremont Cnty., 152 Idaho
207,211,268 P.3d 1159, 1164 (2012) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "If a plat
unambiguously does or does not dedicate land, the plain language ofthe instrument controls."
Id (citation omitted).

The 1954 Plat meets both requirements. 5 First, the 1954 Plat clearly and unequivocally
dedicates the Walk Way to the public. The borders of the Walk Way are delineated in the same

The District Court concluded a common-law dedication occurred, and therefore did not
address the question of statutory dedication. R. at 169 (Decision at 13). The District Court was
correct in finding a common-law dedication. The same facts and arguments together with the
unequivocal acceptance of city and county officials on the Plat (R. 94), support the conclusion a
statutory dedication occurred as well. See e.g., Lattin v. Adams County, 149 Idaho 147,236 P.3d
5
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manner as streets, which are undisputedly dedicated to the public. R at 94 (McClure Affidavit
Exh. 1). The Walk Way abuts the intersection of Taggert Street and Kathryn Street on the south
side, and the intersection of Dill Drive and Taggert Street on the north. Id. The word "Taggert"
is on the south side of the Walk Way, and the word "Street" is on the north side. Id. A
pedestrian traveling north along Taggert Street would cross Kathryn Street, pass through Block 3
on the Walk Way, cross Dill Drive, and continue north along Taggert Street. Id. Without the
Walk Way, the same pedestrian would have to leave Taggert Street, turn east on Kathryn Street,
walk north on Broxon Street, walk west on Dill Drive, and then tum north on Taggert Street. Id.
There does not appear to be on either plat any line delineating or separating this Walk Way from
the other portions of Taggert Street. The Walk Way thus extends the north-south corridor of
Taggert Street through Block 3 of the Subdivision for pedestrian traffic. Id.
The legend is contained in the lower right-hand comer of the 1954 Plat. Id. The symbol
for Public Utilities Easements is a dotted line or cross-hatching. Id. The legend does not contain
1257 (201O)(A common-law dedication requires showing "that 1) there has been a valid offer to
dedicate real property to a public use, and 2) lots were subsequently sold or otherwise conveyed
by instruments which specifically refer to such plat. Filing and recording a plat or map can
establish the owner's intent to make a dedication to the public. The dedication in the plat,
however, must be clear and explicit. Similarly, a statutory dedication under I.e. § 50-1309
requires a plat that unequivocally dedicates a road to public use. The Reico Subdivision plat was
recorded in 1983. Section 50-1309 at that time permitted landowners to dedicate a portion of
their property by recording a plat depicting "all streets and alleys shown on said plat" that is
accepted by the appropriate public entity. I.e. §§ 50-1309, 50-1313 (1982). Although this statute
has since been amended several times, the plat has always had to demark public rights-of-way in
order to dedicate them.") (citing Worley Highway Dist. v. Yacht Club o/Coeur D'Alene, Ltd.,
116 Idaho 219, 225, 775 P.2d Ill, 117 (1989); State v. Fox, 100 Idaho 140, 147,594 P.2d 1093,
1100 (1979); Harshbarger v. Jerome County, 107 Idaho 805, 806-07, 693 P.2d 451,452-53
(1984); and Act of Mar. 26, 1988, ch. 175, sec. 2, 1988 Idaho Sess. Laws 306, 307 (amending
I.e. § 50-1309 to specifically require government approval, but still requiring a marked plat).
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a symbol identifying streets or non-public-utility rights-of-way. Id. However, the legend itself,
or more particularly, the language on the original 1950 Plat initially identifYing the Public
Utilities Easement is not talking about public streets or right of ways, but about a private
easement in gross in favor of public utilities. Tr. at 28-29, 41-42. Cf Volco, Inc. v. Lickley, 126
Idaho 709,889 P.2d 1099 (1995) (rejecting argument that "utility easements" which overlaid
part of fifty foot wide parcel prevented public dedication of that parcel as a public street). In the
1954 Plat, the centerline of the streets is marked by a dotted line distinct from the symbol for
public utility easements. Id. The dotted line marking the centerline of the streets is not
identified in the legend as a symbol. Id. Further, the actual borders of the streets-which are
undisputedly dedicated to the public-are delineated by a solid line, as are the borders of the
Walk Way. Id. The streets are labeled using small capital letters, as is the Walk Way. Id.
The Walk Way is not a path leading through or to a common area of the Subdivision. It
does not provide a pathway from one Subdivision property to another or a pathway to some
Subdivision-specific amenity. Rather, it provides a corridor between two segments of Taggert
Street, which is open to the public. Owners of lots within the Subdivision have no use for the
Walk Way distinct from the use of the public at large. It makes no sense for the grantors to
permit members of the Subdivision to pass through Block 3 along Taggert Street-a public
road-yet require members of the general public to detour around Block 3 by taking Kathryn
Street to either Shoshone Street or Broxon Street, Dill Street back to the center of Block 3, and
then back to along Taggert Street.
Accordingly, the four comers of the 1954 Plat clearly and unequivocally establish the
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Walk Way was dedicated to the public. There can be no dispute the 1954 Plat dedicates the
streets to the public. Id. (dedicating to the public "all streets and rights of way easements not
heretofore dedicated as shown on the plat"). Because the Walk Way is delineated in precisely
the same manner as the streets, it too is dedicated to the public as a right-of-way easement.
Moreover, there is no other reasonable explanation for the Walk Way_ It exists to allow
pedestrian traffic to continue through Block 3. There is no plausible subdivision-specific use. A
thorough and careful examination of the 1954 Plat thus compels the conclusion the Walk Way is
dedicated to the public.
Precedent supports finding a public dedication here. In Smylie v. Pearsall, 93 Idaho 188,
191,457 P.2d 427,430 (1969), a plat showed a strip ofland that extended from a public
driveway, between two lots, to a lakeshore. Though the plat did not label the land a street or
public landing, the Court concluded it was dedicated to the public because "it appears that th[ e]
the parcel was intended as a continuation of the 'driveway' providing natural access to the lake."
Id. at 192,457 P.2d 431.

Likewise, in this case the 1954 Plat shows a strip of property that extends from the south
side of Taggert Street to the north side. It thus "appears that the [Walk Way] was intended as a
continuation of' Taggert Street providing pedestrian access through Block 3. Smylie would
support summary judgment even if the Walk Way were not labeled. In this case the Walk Way
is delineated and labeled in the same manner as the same manner as the publicly dedicated
streets. This exhibits the requisite clear and unequivocal intent to dedicate the Walk Way to the
public. This case certainly presents a stronger case for public dedication than Smylie.
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Indeed, the plat in Smylie (reproduced below) is remarkably similar to the 1954 Plat. The
"Driveway" is delineated and labeled as the same manner as the Walk Way. If the nondelineated, unlabeled property in the Smylie plat was clearly and unequivocally dedicated, it is

difficult to come to the conclusion the delineated, labeled Walk Way in this case is not clearly
and unequivocally dedicated to the public. In Smylie there was no dispute the strip of property
labeled "DRIVE WAY" as well as the parcel to which that Drive Way led was dedicated to the
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public. Likewise in this case there should be no dispute "Walk Way" is dedicated to the public.

~
1

)(
~

In Davis v. Fendell, 158 Wash. App. 1043, *4 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011), the Washington
Court of Appeals addressed a plat showing two delineated-but-unlabeled strips ofland that ran
between adjacent parcels and abutted the perpendicular roads. The court found a public
dedication because "the only natural reading" of the plat is that the strips of property "were in
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fact intended to be roads when the document was filed." Id. "Any other interpretation would
leave a road-like 'no man's land' running between parcels." Id. (emphasis added).
In this case the 1954 Plat shows a strip of property running through Block 3. The Walk
Way abuts the intersection of Kathryn Street and Taggert Street on the south and the intersection
of Dill Drive and Taggert Street on the north. Ifthe Walk Way is not publicly dedicated, there
would be a walkway-like "no man's land" running between parcels. This conclusion makes no
sense here, just as it did not make sense in Davis. That the Walk Way is delineated and labeled
in the same manner as streets only bolsters the conclusion it is dedicated to the pUblic.
ACHD devotes twenty-one pages of a twenty-two page brief criticizing various aspects of
the District Court's reasoning. It devotes a scant three paragraphs to the crux of this casewhether the 1954 Plat clearly and unequivocally dedicates the Walk Way to the public.
Response Brief at 21. Even in these paragraphs ACHD spends more time criticizing the District
Court than providing a rational explanation of the Walk Way aside from a publicly dedicated
pathway for pedestrian travel through Block 3. Id. A close examination of the 1954 Plat reveals
that the Walk Way is dedicated to the public to provide a continuation of Taggert Street's northsouth corridor for pedestrian traffic. ACHD provides no reasonable explanation to the contrary.
Cf Kepler-Fleenor v. Freemont County, 152 Idaho 207, 268 P.3d 1159 (2012) (holding that a
plat depicting a road along with a label saying "60' road & utility easement" and a label saying
"all roads are hereby dedicated to the public" was sufficient to work a common law dedication of
the road); Volco, Inc. v. Lickley, 126 Idaho 709, 889 P.2d 1099 (1995) (The "absence of street
names within the borders of the segments in dispute, as well as the solid lines" along one border
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with a named street did not preclude the possibility that "the original owner's intent to
accomplish such a dedication may be inferred from other circumstances.");
ACHD cites the case of Lattin v. Adams County, 149 Idaho 147,236 P.3d 1257 (2010),
for the proposition that this Court has rejected an argument that Plat language dedicating roads
and right of ways would be meaningless if it were not construed to relate to the road or right-ofway featured on that Plat. That statement overstates Lattin. In the Lattin case, the plat at issue
had an elaborate legend that had "a style of dotted line for easements and public-rights-of-way
that is different from the style indicating the centerline of a private road." !d. In Lattin, the line
portraying the road at issue was clearly that of a private road, "not a public street or a right of
way." The Lattin Court also noted that the legend on that plat was "boilerplate" and included on
many similar maps, as it included "symbols for fences, canals and stone monuments, none of
which appear on this map." Id. By contrast, on the 1954 Plat at issue in the present case, the
Walk Way at issue is depicted in exactly the same way as the other roads, which are
undisputedly public roads. Moreover, the legend on the plat at issue here is specific to this 1954
Plat, listing in addition to public utility easements (which are a private, not a public, easement)
only three other items (types of survey pins), all of which can be found on the 1954 Plat. No part
of the legend provides any reference to what rights of way easements are dedicated to the public
by the statement "rights of way easements not heretofore dedicated as shown on this plat." Thus,
unlike the Lattin case, the District Court here was logical and rational and acting within its
discretion in determining that the reference to "public rights of way easements" in the dedication
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language on the 1954 Plat could only be referring to the Walk Way, as there was simply no
information in the legend or otherwise on indicated on the 1954 Plat to the contrary.
Further, ACHD continues to ignore that the public utilities easement is a private easement
in gross for public utility companies, not a public dedication of a right of way held in trust by a
government agency for the benefit of the public. Whether or not the private dedication of these
public utility easements was effective rises and falls with the other language and symbols on the
1950 and 1954 Plat (and potentially upon language in deeds not even in the record before this
Court), and due to its nature as a private easement, in no way depends on the public dedication of
easements language at the heart of this dispute. See e.g." Ross v. Dorsey,
P.3d

Idaho __ , __

,2013 WL 3064793 (June 20,2013) (Opinion not yet released for publication in the

permanent law reports and is subject to revision or withdrawal until released) ("Idaho law clearly
'recognizes common law dedication of land for private use.' A private common law dedication,
like a public common law dedication, consists of two elements: '(1) an offer by the owner clearly
and unequivocally indicating an intent to dedicate the land and (2) an acceptance of the offer.'
As to the first element: '[t]he offer to dedicate may be made in a number of ways, including the
act of recording or filing a subdivision plat depicting the specific areas subject to dedication, so
long as there is a clear and unequivocal indication the owner intends to dedicate the land as
depicted .... In determining whether the owner intended to offer the land for dedication, the court
must examine the plat, as well as "the surrounding circumstances and conditions of the
development and sale oflots.'" (citations omitted)). Thus, the District Court was completely
correct in apparently concluding that the public utility easement language could not be what the
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"rights of way easements" public dedication language was referring to on the 1954 Plat, as those
are private, not public easements. Further, no such reference to public dedication of "easements"
appeared on the 1950 Plat and there was no reference to a "Walk Way" on that Plat either. The
District Court was logical and rational in concluding that the additional "right of way easements"
public dedication language on the 1954 Plat "would be meaningless if the grantors had not
intended the 'walk way' to be dedicated to the public." Rat 168. The District Court rationally
concluded that this evidenced-without contradiction by any other facts or items in the recordthe "grantors' unambiguous intent to dedicate the 'walk way' to the public." Rat 169. ACHD
provides no basis for its invitation to this Court to second guess the District Court in this regard.
ACHD also spills a great deal of ink contending "[t]he District Court did not cite or apply
the proper standard." Response Brief at 18-21 (bolding and capitalization omitted). This
argument is immaterial. The issue on appeal is whether the District Court correctly granted
summary judgment, not whether the District Court artfully analyzed the issue. The Court
employs a de novo standard of review. Therefore this Court can apply the correct standard even
if the District Court did not.
In any event, the District Court applied the correct standard. It "conclude [d] that the
plats, taken together, contain sufficient evidence of an intent in the grantors ... to make a public
dedication" because "[t]he strip ofland in issue is clearly marked as a walk way." Rat 166
(Decision at 10) (emphasis added). The District Court recognized "Idaho law does not lightly

declare a dedication to be for public use," but rather "[i]n order to find a public dedication, the
intent of the owner to dedicate the property to a public use must be plainly manifest." Id
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(emphasis added, internal quotation marks and citation omitted). It also recognized "[0 ]nce the
clear intent to make a public dedication is made manifest," a public dedication occurs when the
offer is accepted. Id. at 167 (Decision at 11 ) (emphasis added). The District Court ultimately
concluded "the intent of the grantors is made clear by the language of dedication on the 1954
Plat," id. at 168 (Decision at 12) (emphasis added); "that the 1954 [P]lat displays the grantors'
unambiguous intent to dedicate the 'walk way' to the public," id. at 169 (Decision at 13)
(emphasis added); and that "[t]he grantors' intent to dedicate the walkway to the public is clear,"

id at 168 (Decision at 12) (emphasis added). While the District Court did not employ ACHD's
exact preferred wording ("clear and unequivocal intent"), it recognized and applied the correct
standard. Any difference between the phrases "clear and unequivocal intent," "plainly
manifest," "clear intent," and "unambiguous intent" is immaterial and does not support reversing
the grant of summary judgment.
Moreover, the District Court cited and extensively discussed cases that do contain
ACHD's preferred articulation of the common-law dedication standard. At the outset of its
opinion the District Court dedicated five paragraphs to Asbury Park, LLC v. Greenbriar Estate

Homeowners' Ass'n, Inc., 138 Idaho 378, 271 P.3d 1194 (2012). Id. at 162-164 (Decision at 68). Asbury Park applies the "clear and unequivocal" standard. 138 Idaho at 342, 271 P.3d at
1199. The District Court cited Shaw v. Johnston, 17 Idaho 676, 107 P. 399,401 (121Qtanc! __

Ponderosa Homesite Lot Owners v. Garfield Bay Resort, Inc., 143 Idaho 407, 410, 146 P.3d 673,
676 (2006), both of which apply the same standard. ld at 166 (Decision at 10). And it dedicated
a full paragraph to Farrell v. Board ofComm 'rs of Lemhi County, 138 Idaho 378, 384, 64 P.3d
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304,310 (2002), which likewise articulates the common-law dedication standard using ACHD's
preferred language. Id. at 175 (Decision at 19). Thus the District Court was well aware of
ACHD's preferred articulation of the standard, though it did not quote those precise words.
Failure to quote the "magic words" from these cases provides some fodder for ACHD' s appellate
brief. But it does not support reversing the grant of summary judgment.
Would it have been nice for the District Court to quote ACHD's preferred language?
Certainly. Then the parties would not have to argue this ultimately immaterial point. But this
Court does not review cases to chastise District Courts for failing to quote particular phrases. It
reviews cases to ensure the correct result. The 1954 Plat clearly and unequivocally dedicated the
Walk Way to the public. The District Court reached this conclusion, albeit using the phrases
"plainly manifest," "clear intent," and "unambiguous intent" instead of "clear and unequivocal."
The difference is immaterial to the correct outcome and the grant of summary judgment should
be affirmed.

III.

THEWALKWAYISA "HIGHWAY" ANDA "PUBLIC RIGHT-OF-WAY" OWNED BY ACHD.

The second issue is whether the Walk Way is a public highway (which includes "adjacent
lands" and "pedestrian facilities") or public right-of-way. It is. However, before addressing the
substance of why, it bears pointing out that ACHD has raised this as a new legal issue on appeal
that it did not place before the District Court.

A. The power of the ACHD to administer the Walk Way was not raised below.
ACHD has raised the issue of whether the Idaho Code allows ACHD to own the Walk
Way as an issue presented on appeal for the first time in this case. This was not an issue raised
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before the trial court. This Court has noted that "[a]s a general rule an appellate court will
consider only such points as were raised in the trial court, and this rule precludes a party from
asserting, on appeal, claims for relief not assorted or asked for in the court below." Ochoa v.
State, Ins. Special Indem. Fund, 118 Idaho 71, 794 P.2d 1127 (1990) (citations omitted).
Although an "appellate court may exercise its discretion to consider a point for the first time on
appeal where the point involves a pure question of law determinable from uncontroverted facts,"
Id, the posture ofthis case was that a motion for summary judgment was filed in this case "in
lieu of an answer" (R 159) immediately after the Complaint was filed and before any discovery
was conducted. ACHD did not raise any affirmative defenses because it filed no Answer.
ACHD did not have to identify in response to discovery, for example, what type of property it
typically maintained as "adjacent lands" or as "pedestrian facilities." The law that the ACHD
raises potentially implicates factual issues as to whether ACHD is estopped or has acquiesced in
an interpretation of the statutes that is contrary to the interpretation it now argues for for the first
time on appeal. Accordingly, this is not a case where uncontroverted facts merit an exception
from the "general rule," meriting consideration of an issue raised for the first time on appeal.
But if this Court does take up ACHD's invitation to entertain new legal issues beyond the scope
of what it argued to the District Court below, then it is easy enough to demonstrate that those
arguments are without merit.

B. The Walk Way is a "highway."
ACHD has jurisdiction over, among other things, public highways and public rights of
way. See Idaho Code § 40-1310 (highway districts have "exclusive general supervision authority
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of all public highways, public streets, and public rights-of-way" (emphasis added». The term
"highway" includes "roads, streets, alleys and bridges laid out or established for the public or
dedicated or abandoned for the public," as well as "necessary culverts, sluices ... adjacent lands
or interests lawfully acquired, pedestrian facilities, and any other structures, works or fixtures
incidental to the preservation or improvement of the highways." Idaho Code § 40-109(5)
(emphasis added). "Adjacent lands" means just that: property adjacent to a street or road, such
as runaway truck escape ramps. Freeman v. Juker, 119 Idaho 555, 558, 808 P.2d 1300, 1303
(1991) (holding runaway truck ramps are "highways" within the meaning of Idaho Code § 40109(5». No case has addressed the meaning of "pedestrian facilities." However, the meaning is
self-evident: a facility for people traveling by foot.
As explained in more detail below, the Walk Way abuts Taggert Street, Kathryn Street,
and Dill Drive and is therefore "adjacent land" to a road or street. It is also a "pedestrian
facility." Thus it is a defined "highway" over which ACHD has jurisdiction.

(1) The Walk Way is an "adjacent land."
The Walk Way abuts the intersection of Kathryn Street and Taggert Street to the south,
and the intersection of Dill Drive and Taggert Street to the north. Rat 94 (McClure Affidavit
Exh. 1). It functions as a continuation of Taggert Street's north-south corridor for pedestrian
traffic, as evidenced by the word "Taggert" on the south and "Street" on the north. Nothing
separates the Walk Way from Kathryn Street, Dill Drive, or Taggert Street. It is thus "adjacent"
to these three public streets within the plain meaning of that term. E.g., Webster's Unabridged
Dictionary (2d ed. 1998) (defining "adjacent" as "lying near, close, or contiguous; adjoining;
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neighboring"). This is confirmed by Freeman v. Juker, in which the Court concluded runaway
truck ramps are "public highways" because they are adjacent to. 119 Idaho at 558, 808 P.2d at
1303. Because the Walk Way immediately abuts Kathryn Street, Dill Drive, and Taggert Street,
it is an "adjacent land" like the runaway truck ramps in Freeman v. Juker.
ACHD concedes that "[t]his Court has broadly interpreted the term highway" to include
property that is "'roadside' or 'adjacent' to a roadway." Opening Brief at 8. Yet ACHD
confusingly contends the Walk Way is "certainly not roadside or adjacent to a roadway." Id. at 9
(emphasis added). On the contrary, whatever direction one holds the 1954 Plat, upside-down,
sideways, tilted halfway to the left, the Walk Way certainly is adjacent to several public
roadways. The Walk Way abuts Kathryn Street and Dill Drive. 6 R at 94 (McClure Affidavit Exh.
1). It also abuts Taggert Street, insofar as Taggert Street's corridor for pedestrian traffic
continues along the Walk Way. Id. Thus the Walk Way is land adjacent to public roadways and
a "highway" under Idaho Code § 40-109(5).

(2) The Walk Way is a "pedestrian facility."
The term "highway" includes "pedestrian facilities." Idaho Code § 40-109(5). The Court
ACHD states, "The Walk Way runs perpendicular to and between Dill Drive and
Kathryn Street, certainly not roadside or adjacent to a roadway." Opening Brief at 9 (emphasis
added). The first clause ofthis statement refutes its ultimate conclusion. That the Walk Way
runs perpendicular to and between Dill Drive and Kathryn Street proves the Walk Way is
adjacent to a roadway. For ACHD's statement to make any sense, it must implicitly contend the
term "adjacent lands" encompasses only lands that are parallel to a road. But runaway truck
ramps are not parallel to a road, yet they are adjacent lands. See Freeman v. Juker, 119 Idaho at
558,808 P.2d at 1303. And the term "adjacent" means "lying near, close, or contiguous;
adjoining, neighboring." Webster's Unabridged Dictionary (2d ed. 1998). There is no
requirement that an adjacent land be parallel to a roadway. Because the Walk Way abuts Dill
Drive, Kathryn Street, and Taggert Street, it is land adjacent to a roadway and thus a "highway."
6
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has not addressed the meaning of this phrase. The plain language of the term "pedestrian" is a
person traveling by foot. E.g., Webster's Unabridged Dictionary (2d ed. 1998) (defining
"pedestrian" as "a person who goes or travels on foot; walker" and "of or pertaining to
walking"). A facility is "something designed, built, installed, etc. to serve a specific function
affording a convenience or service." Id. Thus a "pedestrian facility" is something designed to
afford convenient travel by foot. A walkway is an obvious example of a pedestrian facility.
E.g., id. (defining "walkway" as "any passage for walking"). 7

The Walk Way is a pedestrian facility. It is labeled "Walk Way," that is, a pathway or
corridor for walking. The Walk Way's location indicates it was intended to provide a
continuation of Taggert Street's north-south corridor for pedestrian traffic. See Rat 94 (McClure
Affidavit Exh. 1). Thus the Walk Way falls within the plain meaning ofthe phrase "pedestrian

facility. "
ACHD's discussion of the definition of "highway" does not address the obvious point
that the Walk Way is a "pedestrian facility," even though the District Court concluded precisely
that. Opening Briefat 8-9 (discussing definition of "highway"); Rat 171 (Decision at 15)
("Here, the walkway at issue connects and fronts upon two public streets. It is clearly a
'pedestrian facility,' and the ACHD clearly has the statutory authority to administer it."). This is
a glaring oversight. The Walk Way is manifestly a "pedestrian facility" and is thus a "highway"
within the meaning ofldaho Code § 40-109(5). The Walk Way is a continuation of Taggert
"Pedestrian," "facility," and "walkway" are such common terms a dictionary is largely
unnecessary. Ms. Rowley provides a dictionary definition only to illustrate the plain meaning of
these terms.
7
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Street and therefore a logical extension of the public roadway system. This defeats any potential
contention by ACHD that it lacks jurisdiction over non-roadway-related pedestrian facilities. 8
Instead of actually arguing the Walk Way is not a "pedestrian facility," in a separate
section of its Opening Brief ACHD faults the District Court for relying on Title 49 for the
definition of "pedestrian" and "pedestrian path.,,9 Opening Briefat 12. Fair enough. Perhaps
the District Court should have referred to a dictionary, or simply relied upon its knowledge of the
English language. But the result would be the same. A pedestrian is a person traveling on foot,
just as the District Court concluded, and a walkway is a pedestrian facility, just as the District
Court concluded. Rat 170 (Decision at 14). ACHD does not (and cannot) contend the term
"pedestrian" means anything other than a person traveling by foot. It also does not (and cannot)
contend the Walk Way is anything but a facility for pedestrian travel. The District Court's
judgment stands even if ACHD is correct in arguing it should not have cited Title 49. The Walk
Way is a "pedestrian facility" within the plain language of the term. Consequently the Walk
Way is a highway over which ACHD has jurisdiction.
8 ACHD did not make this contention in the Opening Brief, and therefore any such
contention is waived even if presented in reply. E.g., Myers v. Workman's Auto Ins. Co., 140
Idaho 495,507,95 P.3d 977,990 (2004) ("[T]his Court will not consider arguments raised for
the first time in the appellant's reply brief." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted». Ms.
Rowley makes this argument only out of an abundance of caution.

9 The District Court cited Idaho Code § 49-117(5), which defines "pedestrian" as "any
person afoot and any person operating a wheelchair or a motorized wheelchair or an electric
personal assistive mobility device." It also cited Idaho Code § 49-117(6), which defines
"pedestrian path" as "any path, sidewalk or way set-aside and used exclusively by pedestrians."
Rat 170 (Decision at 14). Title 49's definition of these terms comports with their plain meaning.
Therefore ifthe District Court erred by citing these definitions, the error was entirely harmless
and does not support reversal. See Myers, 140 Idaho at 504, 95 P.3d at 986 ("This Court will not
reverse the trial court if an alleged error is harmless.").
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c.

The Walk Way is a "public right-of-way."
ACHD has jurisdiction over both highways (which include "adjacent lands" and

"pedestrian facilities") and public rights-of-way. Idaho Code § 40-1310. A "public right-ofway" includes "includes right-of-way[s] which w[ere] originally intended for development as a
highway and was accepted on behalf of the public." Idaho Code § 40-117(9) (emphasis added).
Because the Walk Way was originally intended for development as a highway (i.e., for
development as an adjacent land and pedestrian facility), it is a public right-of-way over which
ACHD has jurisdiction.
The Walk Way was clearly and unequivocally dedicated to the pUblic. See supra section
II. It was intended to serve as a continuation of Taggert Street's north-south corridor for
pedestrian traffic. See id. Thus it was "originally intended for development as a highway,"
specifically as development as an adjacent land and pedestrian facility. Idaho Code § 40-117(9).
The City of Boise accepted the public dedication. R at 94 (McClure Affidavit Exh. 1). Thus the
Walk Way is a "public right-of-way" over which ACHD has jurisdiction. Idaho Code § 401310.
ACHD argues that the Walk Way is not a public right-of-way because it is not open to
the public and no statute gives ACHD the authority to expend funds on it. Opening Brie/at 9.
This argument focuses solely on the first sentence of the definition of "public right-of-way,"
which defines public right-of-way to include "a right-of-way open to the public and under the
jurisdiction of a public highway agency, where the public highway agency has no obligation to
construct or maintain, but may expend funds for the maintenance of, said public right-of-way."
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Idaho Code § 40-117(9).10 ACHD inexplicably ignores the second sentence, which provides "a
public right-of-way includes a right of way which was originally intended for development as a
highway and which was accepted on behalf of the public." Id (emphasis added). The Walk
Way was originally intended as development as a highway, specifically as an adjacent land and a
pedestrian facility. ACHD truly seems to be contending here that it cannot hold unopened public
right-of-ways that have been dedicated to it, accepted by it, but not yet opened. This is not the
law. See e.g., Homestead Farms, Inc. v. Board of Com 'rs of Teton County, 141 Idaho 855, 119
P.3d 630 (2005)(J. Eismann specially concurring)(noting that Idaho Code Section 40-202(3)
"sets forth three classifications of highways that are to be included on the highway map: ... (2)
Highways that are 'located and recorded by order of the board of commissioners,' but not
10 Idaho Code § 40-117(9) provides, in full,
"Public right-of-way" means a right-of-way open to the public and
under the jurisdiction of a public highway agency, where the
public highway agency has no obligation to construct or maintain,
but may expend funds for the maintenance of, said public right-ofway or post traffic signs for vehicular traffic on said public rightof-way. In addition, a public right-of-way includes a right-of-way
which was originally intended for development as a highway and
was accepted on behalf of the public by deed of purchase, fee
simple title, authorized easement, eminent domain, by plat,
prescriptive use, or abandonment of a highway pursuant to section
40-203, Idaho Code, but shall not include federal land rights-ofway, as provided in section 40-204A, Idaho Code, that resulted
from the creation of a facility for the transmission of water. Public
rights-of-way shall not be considered improved highways for the
apportionment of funds from the highway distribution account.
(emphasis added). ACHD contends the Walk Way is not a "public right-of-way" under the first
sentence but entirely ignores the second. The Walk Way is a "public right-of-way" under the
underlined portion of the definition.
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opened. "). Therefore, the Walk Way at issue, even if it is not yet opened, is nevertheless a
public right-of-way under the second sentence ofldaho Code § 49-117(9), even if ACHD's
argument regarding the first sentence is correct.

D. ACHD owns the Walk Way.
Under Idaho Code § 40-1409(2), title to all property belonging to a city highway system
automatically transfers to a succeeding county-wide highway district. ACHD is the county-wide
highway district for Ada County, in which Boise is located. The City of Boise obtained title to
the Walk Way in 1954 by accepting the 1954 Plat's offer of public dedication. Rat 94 (McClure

Affidavit Exh. 1). Thus title to all highways and public rights-of-way owned by the City of
Boise-including the Walk Way-transferred to ACHD as a matter of law when ACHD was
created. See Idaho Code § 40-1409(2). ACHD owns the Walk Way,just as it owns the publicly
dedicated roads delineated on the 1954 Plat.
ACHD does not dispute this contention. The Opening Brie/focuses exclusively on the
predicate questions, i.e., whether the Walk Way was dedicated to the public and whether ACHD
has jurisdiction over the Walk Way. It is therefore functionally undisputed that ACHD owns the
Walk Way so long as the Court concludes in Ms. Rowley's favor on the predicate questions.
ACHD has waived any argument to the contrary by failing to raise it in the Opening Brief E.g.,

Myers, 140 Idaho at 507, 95 P .3d at 990 ("[T[his Court will not consider arguments raised for the
first time in the appellant's reply brief." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted». ACHD
therefore owns the Walk Way.
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IV.

ACHD's REMAINING ARGUMENTS ARE NOT PERSUASIVE.
Ms. Rowley addresses the majority of ACHD's arguments above. Neither of the two
. .

.

remammg arguments are persuaSIve.

II

First, ACHD argues that it does not have jurisdiction over the Walk Way because the
Local Land Use Plarming Act ("LLUPA"), Idaho Code § 67-6518, authorizes cities and counties
to "adopt standards for such things as roadways, streets, lanes ... pedestrian walkways."
Opening Brief at 13. But LLUPA' s grant of authority to adopt standards for certain items,
including "roads, streets, lanes ... and pedestrian walkways" does not oust ACHD' s jurisdiction.
Idaho Code § 67-6518 (emphasis added). Rather, ACHD's jurisdiction coexists alongside cities'
and counties' authority to adopt standards. See Worley Highway Dist. v. Kootenai Cnty., 104
Idaho 833, 837, 663 P.2d 1135, 1139 (1983) (holding the Land Use Plarming Act grants cities
and counties the power to adopt standards for street naming and numbering, an authority that
exists alongside highway districts' jurisdiction of roadways).
Indeed, if ACHD's argument were correct it would not have jurisdiction over "roads" or
"streets" within city limits. Idaho Code § 67-6518 authorizes cities and counties to adopt
standards for "roadways" and "streets" as well as "pedestrian walkways." Idaho Code § 67-6518
(granting authority to establish standards for "roads, streets, lanes ... and pedestrian walkways"
(emphasis added». IfLLUPA's listing of "pedestrian walkways" outs ACHD'sjurisdiction over
them, LLUP A's listing of "roads, streets [and] lanes" would oust ACHD's jurisdiction over them
II Further, these are also argument that are raised for the first time on appeal and on this
basis alone should be rejected by this Court for the same reasons set forth in Section lILA.,
supra.
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as well. ACHD cannot maintain this absurd position. Because the Walk Way is a highway and
public right-of-way within Idaho Code § 40-1310, ACHD has jurisdiction over it. LLUPA's
grant of authority to establish standards for roads, streets, lanes, and pedestrian walkways does
not oust ACHD's jurisdiction.
Second, ACHD contends the District Court impermissibly presumed a public dedication.
Opening Brief at 20. The District Court did no such thing. It recognized that "Idaho law does

not lightly declare a dedication to be for public use," and that "(i]n order to find a public
dedication, the intent of the owner to dedicate the property to a public use must be 'plainly
manifest. '" R at 166-167 (Decision at 10-11 ) (emphasis added). It carefully reviewed the 1950
Plat, the 1954 Plat, and the corresponding CC&Rs. Id. at 168-169 (Decision at 12-13). It
ultimately concluded "(t]he grantors' intent to dedicate the walkway to the public is clear." Id. at
168 (Decision at 12). The District Court did not presume a public dedication; it concluded the

1954 Plat clearly manifested intent to dedicate the Walk Way to the public. This conclusion is
correct and should be affirmed.
Even if the District Court presumed an easement, this case is before the Court on de novo
review. Therefore the Court can review the 1954 Plat under the correct standard. Accordingly,
ACHD's argument is ultimately irrelevant. Because the 1954 Plat clearly and unequivocally
dedicates the Walk Way to the public, the grant of summary judgment should be affirmed.

V.

Ms. ROWLEY IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL.
On its face, the 1954 Plat clearly and unequivocally dedicates the Walk Way to the

public. ACHD's appellate brieflargely criticizes the District Court's reasoning without
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supplying the Court a basis to overturn the grant of summary judgment. Idaho Code Section 12117(1) provides for an award of attorneys fees and costs if the Court finds that "the nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law with respect to that portion of the
case." ACHD's contentions on appeal are without a reasonable legal or factual basis.
Consequently Ms. Rowley is entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal under Idaho Code

§ 12-117(1).
CONCLUSION

ACHD takes issue with numerous aspects of the District Court's opinion. Yet it entirely
fails to establish the District Court's judgment was incorrect. A review of the 1954 Plat reveals
the Walk Way was dedicated to the public as a continuation of Taggert Street's north-south
corridor for pedestrian traffic. The Walk Way is adjacent to a roadway. It is a pedestrian
facility. And it is a public right-of-way. Therefore ACHD owns the Walk Way. The Court
should affirm the District Court's grant of summary judgment and award attorney fees to Ms.
Rowley.
Givens Pursley LLP

omas E. Dvorak
Counsel for Terry H. Rowley
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